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Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility
The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no more vulnerable to luck than is compatibilism. But compatibilist accounts of luck are themselves vulnerable to a powerful luck historical compatibilisms cannot satisfactorily explain how agents can take responsibility for their constitutive luck; non-historical compatibilisms run into insurmountable difficulties with the epistemic condition on control over action. Levy argues that because epistemic conditions on control are so demanding that they are rarely satisfied, agents are not blameworthy for performing actions
that they take to be best in a given situation. It follows that if there are any actions for which agents are responsible, they are akratic actions; but even these are unacceptably subject to luck. Levy goes on to discuss recent non-historical compatibilisms, and argues that they do not offer a viable alternative to control-based compatibilisms. He suggests that luck undermines our freedom and moral responsibility no matter whether determinism is true or not.
that they take to be best in a given situation. It follows that if there are any actions for which agents are responsible, they are akratic actions; but even these are unacceptably subject to luck. Levy goes on to discuss recent non-historical compatibilisms, and argues that they do not offer a viable alternative to control-based compatibilisms. He suggests that luck undermines our freedom and moral responsibility no matter whether determinism is true or not.
- GenresPhilosophyPsychology
238 pages, Hardcover
First published June 30, 2011
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September 2, 2018
This is my second time reading Hard Luck. I first read it in April 2016 (and it is now September 2018). I've benefited a lot from this second reading, partly because I've become a bit more acquainted with the moral responsibility literature, and partly because my general philosophical expertise has increased.
The first time I read the book I found it quite challenging to read. This was significantly due to my reading it broken up into chapters downloaded from OUP online. This time, fortunately, I had a hard copy. This improved the readability dramatically, although there were still a couple of times where it was a bit tricky. That said, some of Neil's arguments are tricky, so this is to be expected.
I also initially gave the book 3 stars, and am now upgrading it to 4. This is for three reasons. Firstly, Neil's arguments are very convincing. He supports them well, with intuitive premises, and he seems to fill all the potential cracks. Secondly, he is very systematic in his approach. He produces two independent arguments why we lack moral responsibility: the luck pincer, and we never satisfy the epistemic conditions on control when we act badly (and asymmetric accounts of moral responsibility fail). Dealing with Neil's contentions will be a significant challenge for anyone willing to try, precisely because of how systematic and plausible they are. Thirdly, Hard Luck is incredibly ambitious. Not only does Neil provide two independent arguments why most theories of moral responsibility fail, he goes through (seemingly) every theory of moral responsibility and critiques them for other reasons, often apparently decisively. Taking on all of these theories in both of these ways was extremely bold, and makes for a dense and deeply rewarding read.
Overall, an excellent book on moral responsibility. Even for those who, unlike me, are not convinced by the problem(s) of luck, there are many independent arguments and insights here to make it worth reading.
The first time I read the book I found it quite challenging to read. This was significantly due to my reading it broken up into chapters downloaded from OUP online. This time, fortunately, I had a hard copy. This improved the readability dramatically, although there were still a couple of times where it was a bit tricky. That said, some of Neil's arguments are tricky, so this is to be expected.
I also initially gave the book 3 stars, and am now upgrading it to 4. This is for three reasons. Firstly, Neil's arguments are very convincing. He supports them well, with intuitive premises, and he seems to fill all the potential cracks. Secondly, he is very systematic in his approach. He produces two independent arguments why we lack moral responsibility: the luck pincer, and we never satisfy the epistemic conditions on control when we act badly (and asymmetric accounts of moral responsibility fail). Dealing with Neil's contentions will be a significant challenge for anyone willing to try, precisely because of how systematic and plausible they are. Thirdly, Hard Luck is incredibly ambitious. Not only does Neil provide two independent arguments why most theories of moral responsibility fail, he goes through (seemingly) every theory of moral responsibility and critiques them for other reasons, often apparently decisively. Taking on all of these theories in both of these ways was extremely bold, and makes for a dense and deeply rewarding read.
Overall, an excellent book on moral responsibility. Even for those who, unlike me, are not convinced by the problem(s) of luck, there are many independent arguments and insights here to make it worth reading.
Displaying 1 of 1 review